Public Bill Committee

[Mr. Jim Hood in the Chair]

(Except clauses 4, 11, 14 and 23, schedule 2, and any new clauses or new schedules relating to the termination of pregnancy by registered medical practitioners) - Schedule 6

Amendments relating to parenthood in cases involving assisted reproduction

Question proposed [this day], That the schedule, as amended, be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.

Question again proposed.

Dawn Primarolo: I have one last point to make in response to the issues raised by hon. Members.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, South-East asked about whether the fact that a child was donor-conceived should be on the birth certificate. In recognising the difficulty that others, such as the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Royal College of Midwives, have with that being on a public document, he raised the prospect of whether one way round the problem would be to have two birth certificatesone public and one private. The private one would be longer and would indicate that the individual was donor-conceived.
I will not express an opinion either way, because we are discussing one of the options that we would need to consider when carrying out a review, which we have committed ourselves to doing within four years of the Bill coming into force. The question is whether there is a way in which the law can be changed to balance the issues that hon. Members have raisedthe right to know of the donor-conceived child against the rights of the donor and anonymityand to make progress. That is certainly the sort of issue that could be explored, and that was why the Government decided that it was better to consider it in the context of a review and to report back to the House.
The schedule is long because it deals with England and Wales; where the law varies in Scotland, it deals with Scotland, and it also deals with Northern Ireland. Much of it is duplication, but for different jurisdictions.

John Pugh: In the previous sitting, the Minister mentioned the pre-screening of embryos and that type of thing. She made a perfectly valid point, but I think that she would recognise that many diseases for which there is a genetic predisposition cannot be properly screened for, certainly at the embryo stage. Also, over the 18 years before the child can make inquiries about his genetic background, there might be other discoveries that link genetic factors with illness. It is therefore not a complete answer to say that the embryo that is the subject of in vitro fertilisation is privileged in that respect. It will be privileged in some respects, but there will still be a problem.

Dawn Primarolo: I am sorry to disagree, but I do not think that the hon. Gentlemans point makes the case either. First, to say Well, something could happen in the future, but we dont know, applies to us all. Secondly, the parents will have a duty and all parents will want to do the best for their child. If something happened before the individual was 18, the parents would clearly need to think very carefully about what steps they might be able to take in those circumstances. We are talking about screening for things that we do not know that we need to be screened for. With respect, it is a preposterous proposition to say that therefore this should apply to somebody else. Of course, when the child gets to 18, they have an absolute right to know the identity of the person. This is an interesting debating point, but it does not shed any light on the reasons why we would want to put the proposed information on the birth certificate.
I am not saying that the Government have set their face against the proposal. I am saying that this is a highly complex issue, which balances a whole series of rights, including those of the donor. We need to consider the possibilities in the light of the new legislation, and that was why the four-year review was proposed.

Evan Harris: I agree with both the Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Southport[Interruption.] I know that that is hard to do, but I am trying to bring members of the Committee together.
There will be advancesperhaps even genetic chipsin the future, and we might be able to screen for diseases that we cannot screen for at the moment. Nevertheless, the Minister is right that we cannot future-proof things, and my hon. Friends point is not a good enough argument for changing the current position. Indeed, I do not think that it will ever be a good enough argument for invading the privacy of families. There is always a risk that we will inherit somethinglife is full of risks.

Dawn Primarolo: There is no end to the hon. Gentlemans talents. He isI say this genuinely, but also as a bit of a joke, so I hope that he takes it in the right spirita conciliator as well. He makes the important point that the distance between what I and the hon. Member for Southport are saying is not that great. We are both saying that we need to consider the issue properly and balance the rights of all those involved, and we should not do that in haste.
Mark Simmonds (Boston and Skegness) (Con) rose

Dawn Primarolo: That was a good, conciliatory point to end on, but the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness wants to intervene first.

Mark Simmonds: I understand what the Minister says, and she is right that these matters are extremely complicated. Will she say a little more, however, about how the Government came to the view that four years was the appropriate length of time for the consultation? Although these are complex issues, four years is still an extraordinarily long time to take reaching a conclusion.

Dawn Primarolo: We made a commitment to carry the review forward within four years. As I said, the Government were seeking common ground by making it clear that we had not set our face against the proposal or decided on the issue in principle. We also clearly needed time to assess things such as telling and talking, the Donor Conception Network project and the extra work on counselling. Equally, we were trying to meet the legitimate concerns of Lord Jenkin, who proposed the four-year period in his amendment in another place. We picked that up, but included the caveat that the review would happen within four years. I assume that Lord Jenkin was looking for a sunset provision to ensure that the review would definitely be done by a certain time, although it could be done earlier if necessary. That was why we settled on four years. To follow on from the comments made by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon, let me say that the Government were trying to be conciliatorywe were trying to find common ground.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 57 and 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Surrogacy arrangements

Mark Simmonds: I beg to move amendment No. 178, in clause 59, page 49, line 23, at end insert
(2C) Not for profit bodies can only recoup the costs incurred
(a) initiating or taking part in negotiations with a view to the making of a surrogacy arrangement, or
(b) compiling any information with a view to its use in making, or negotiating the making of, a surrogacy arrangement..
Clause 59 brings us back to surrogacy arrangements, which are not enforceable in law, as the Minister correctly said. The Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 prohibits organisations or people, other than intended parents or surrogate mothers, from undertaking certain activities relating to surrogacy on a commercial basis, and that is absolutely correct.
Not-for-profit bodies can charge a fee to initiate negotiations with a view to making surrogacy arrangements and compiling information about surrogacy. However, they are not allowed to receive payments for offering to negotiate a surrogacy arrangement or for taking part in negotiations about them. However, they are allowed to do such things if there is no charge. There is thus potential for cross-subsidisation, with not-for-profit organisations charging more for the activities for which they are able to charge so that they can undertake those activities for which they are not able to charge.
The amendment would ensure that cross-subsidy was prevented, and that charges that were allowed for initiating negotiations or providing information could be commensurate only with the costs incurred in fulfilling those specific roles, and not in generating revenue so that not-for-profit organisations could get involved in other things.

Dawn Primarolo: We have discussed various elements of surrogacy as it relates to the Bill. Clause 59 amends the 1985 Act to clarify the position in law of non-profit making surrogacy organisations. It makes clear that they may charge for their services on a non-profit making basis, and enables them to advertise the services for which they may charge. Such bodies get involved in initiating negotiations with a view to making surrogacy arrangements, and compiling information about surrogacy with a view to its use in making or negotiating a surrogacy arrangement. We recognise that it is difficult for surrogacy organisations to provide a service for a small number of people who seek advice and help with surrogacy in the UK if they are unable to recoup the costs of providing those services.
The amendment would ensure that non-profit surrogacy organisations could recoup the costs incurred only for initiating or taking parting in negotiations with a view to making surrogacy arrangements, or compiling any information with a view to its use in making surrogacy arrangements. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that that is what the Bill does, albeit in a slightly different way.
Clause 59 says that an organisation may charge for certain activities, but only if it is
not carried on for profit.
It may charge for: initiating negotiations with a view to making a surrogacy arrangement; enabling interested parties to meet each other to discuss possible surrogacy arrangements; compiling information about surrogacy with a view to its use in making or negotiating a surrogacy arrangement; and establishing and keeping lists of people willing to be surrogates or intended parents.
I can absolutely assure the hon. Gentleman that subsections (2), (4) and (5) insert provisions into the 1985 Act that achieve exactly the intentions behind his amendment. I make it clear that the measure will allow organisations to recoup the costs of providing these services only on a not-for-profit basis. The provisions would enable not-for-profit organisations to charge for putting couples in touch with each other, but not for any more direct intervention in the discussion. I appreciate that that is a fine lineit is exactly the line that the hon. Gentleman wants to ensure is in placebut I assure him and the Committee that the amendments to the 1985 Act are not intended to turn surrogacy into a commercial industry. The arrangements will be kept exactly as they are. The 1985 Act contained firm steps to ban any commercialisation of surrogacy and that principle has not been changed.
I hope that those strong reassurances will satisfy the hon. Gentleman that we have stayed on the correct side of the fine line. I am grateful for the opportunity to spell that out clearly.

Mark Simmonds: I am grateful for the Ministers constructive response to my probing amendment and for her reassurance that there is to be no movement away from the principle that surrogacy is prohibited from becoming a commercial activity in this country. I am assured from what she said that the point behind the amendment is covered elsewhere in the clause.
Before I withdraw the amendment, I want to point out that I am still somewhat concerned about something. I do not suggest that non-profit organisations in the surrogacy field would do so, but I am aware that there are other non-profit organisations that are good at increasing their cost base to make sure that they do not make any profit and that they therefore come within the guidelines, but they do so while increasing their revenue streams. We certainly would not want to deter people from participation in surrogacy for financial reasons and financial purposes.

Dawn Primarolo: I agree about the importance of that. I should also have made something clear to the hon. Gentleman about attempts at a cross-subsidysomething that he touched onby showing that costs were very high for the introduction, on a so-called not-for-profit basis. If there was seen to have been a cross-subsidy in the arrangements, in any way, that would be an offence under the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, and would be dealt with accordingly. I hope that I have reassured the hon. Gentleman about that.

Mark Simmonds: I am grateful for that point, which clarifies the only outstanding point I had to raise about the amendment. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mark Simmonds: I beg to move amendment No. 179, in clause 59, page 49, line 38, leave out subsection (7).
The amendment relates to advertising. At present, there is an outright ban on advertising for surrogacy services. The purpose of the amendment is to extract from the Minister what positive changes she believes will come about as a result of the changes to the 1985 Act. I understand that the clause would not allow profits to be used for advertising services, except with regard to initiating or negotiating an agreement, or compiling information. My understanding is that those concerned would be able to advertise that they had a list of people who were willing to be involved in surrogacy, for example.
My amendment would return the rules on advertising to the existing ones under the 1985 Act and prevent not-for-profits from advertising any particular services. I cannot seeand I have not heard anywhere, prior to our discussion nowany defence of, or justification for, the change. Presumably people who were thinking of using a surrogate would be able to find the information anyway, without advertisements, because they would have been interested in it and thinking about it for several years. It would also be wrong to influence people by advertisements.
Would the offences in relation to contravening the ban on advertising under the clause be the same as for contravening other provisions of the 1985 Act, or would that be something additional to be included in a subsequent Bill?

Dawn Primarolo: The hon. Gentlemans probing amendment deals with the extent of what can be advertised and whether there is variation from the provisions of the 1985 Act. I shall deal with those specific questions.
As I said, clause 59 amends the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 to clarify the position of non-profit making surrogacy organisations. It allows them to charge for their services on a non-profit basis, and it also enables them to advertise the services for which they may charge. The activities that those bodies carry out involve the following: initiating negotiations with a view to making surrogacy arrangements, thus enabling interested parties to meet each other; and compiling information about surrogates, with a view to using it in making or negotiating surrogate arrangementsto establish and keep lists of willing surrogates and intended parents. Those two activities have to be considered together. The question is how to put the intended surrogate, the woman who is prepared to be a surrogate, and interested parents in touch.
The amendment would remove the provision on advertising. At present, it is unlawful for anyone to advertise that they are or may be willing to enter into a surrogacy arrangement. It is also against the law for people to advertise that they are looking for a surrogate or for intended parents. Those provisions are contained in 1985 Act, and the Bill does not change them. Clause 59(7) amends the 1985 Act to allow non-profit-making bodies to advertise the services for which they may chargefor initiating or taking part in negotiations, or compiling information with a view to making surrogacy arrangements.
I assure the hon. Gentleman that the Bill clarifies what a not-for-profit organisation can do without undertaking commercial surrogacy activities. It can advertise its own services, but it would need to be very clear about the fact that it has to stop at that point. What is still prohibited is individuals advertising the fact that they are looking for a surrogate and the publishing of names. Such specific services are still coveredthe Bill has not changed that.
I hope that the Committee recognises that the provisions are not intended to make surrogacy into a commercial business. We recognise that, for some, surrogacy is an option of last resort and that the organisations that provide them with advice and information need to be able at least to publicise the fact that their services may be of assistance. It seems unnecessary to make things more difficult than they already are, but it is necessary to clarify matters and to ensure that the 1985 Act prohibitions stand. I hope that the hon. Gentleman accepts my explanation.

Mark Simmonds: I am grateful to the Minister for her response. It might be that the confusionif that is the right wordrests on what advertisement means. Is it the same as making information available, or does it mean promulgating a service and attracting an audience to a service provision? There is no problem if it means information, but the word advertisement has a commercial connotation. The Minister gave a clear explanation of the meaning of proposed new subsection (1A) to section 3 of the 1985 Act means and the difference that applies, but she did not explain why the measure has been drafted or what positive difference it will make. I have not had any experience of, or been contacted by, anybody, either from my constituency or elsewhere, who has not been able to find out about matching and commissioning people who are prepared to be surrogates, so there is no failure in the structure of the 1985 system. I am therefore not sure that the word advertisement adds anything.
The Minister was right to reconfirm that the measure does not amount to a commercialisation of surrogacy, and I agree with her. However, what difference would the measure make to those who were trying to access surrogacy services by allowing those who provide the service to advertise over and above the current provision of services? The measure does not seem to make any difference, so I do not see the point of it.

Dawn Primarolo: My answer will take longer than a normal intervention. The Government are aware that a number of agreementsthe number is small rather than vastare reached each year, as I mentioned in my contributions to debates on other surrogacy measures, which is linked to the point that the hon. Gentleman made on what can be advertised.
However, the point is that bodies can make a charge, on a non-profit making basis, for initiating negotiations with a view to making a surrogacy agreement and, as I said, enabling interested parties to meet each other. Some organisations would find it difficult to present such servicesthey are not commercial, which is to say that they are not for profitunder the 1985 Act. The Government are clarifying the difference between what we consider to be commercial and not for profit. We are not going to see adverts on television because we are talking about a specialised area and small group of people. The advertising can draw the publics attention, but charging people who want to initiate negotiations is not for profit.
I accept what the hon. Gentleman said. He said that those parents who have taken the big step, for whom surrogacy is the last resort, are more than likely to be aware of everything. It could be considered churlish to make things more difficult just because we can when we are limiting what is provided by the 1985 Act. This is about the difference between what organisations are allowed to provide on a non-profit making basis and thus charge for, which is basically the introduction, and the commercial aspect. Individuals are not allowed to advertise and we do not allow the publication of a list of individuals, or for people to say, Im an individual looking for a surrogate. That type of advertising is not permitted. That is the fine line that we seek to draw. That is a slightly elongated attempt to pick up the points, but I hope that I have clarified the situation.

Mark Simmonds: I am grateful to the Minister for that further clarification. She is absolutely right to highlight the difference between non-profit-making and charging elements. However, I ask that she and the relevant civil servants monitor the situation carefully, because there is concern that it might be possible to stretch the envelope in ways that were never intended for the advertising and marketing of services. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 59 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 60

Exclusion of embryos from definition of organism in Part 6 of the EPA 1990

John Pugh: I beg to move amendment No. 152, in clause 60, page 50, line 1, leave out from (2) to end of line 2 and insert
after or human embryos, insert but includes human admixed embryos..
I move the amendment on behalf of the right hon. Member for Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill (Mr. Clarke). It would incorporate human admixed embryos into the definition of genetically modified organisms in the Environmental Protection Act 1990 as organisms that need to be regulated in case of any foreseeable danger to the environment or dissemination of dangerous developments. Clause 60 specifically excludes human admixed embryos from the Act. Part 6 of the Act, which deals with genetically modified organisms, states that it exists
for the purpose of preventing or minimising any damage to the environment which may arise from the escape or release from human control of genetically modified organisms.
Section 106(2) says:
In this Part the term organism means any acellular, unicellular or multicellular entity...other than humans or human embryos.
As I understand it, clause 60 adds to that or human admixed embryos. The amendment would change the wording to read:
In this Part the term organism means any acellular, unicellular or multicellular entity...other than humans or human embryos but includes human admixed embryos.
The rationale came as much as anything else from that august body the Select Committee on Science and Technology. When it recognised the possibility that new diseases could arise from mixing human and animal material and recommended cytoplasmic hybrid embryos, it said:
In the event that research using cytoplasmic hybrid embryos is authorised, we urge the Government to ensure that appropriate risk management procedures are established and implemented.
The Government responded:
The Government agrees with the Committee that researchers will have to apply appropriate risk management procedures for research that involves the mixing of human and animal materials. We will keep the current procedures under review.
What we are looking for in this probing amendment is recognition from the Government that they have considered all possible safety concerns and whether the Environmental Protection Act 1990 is the appropriate vehicle for addressing them.
The Science and Technology Committee received submissions from the Scottish Council on Human Bioethics, which told us that by undertaking such work, scientists risk creating new diseases and that it is
well known that many animals may harbour in their organs, cells and genome, microbiological and other entities which may cross the species barrier and develop in the host.
Given their concerns and those expressed by the Select Committee, the amendment is a probing one designed to find out whether the Government have taken those concerns on board, particularly as we all recognise, having read the legislation, that human admixed embryos is a fairly wide category.

Evan Harris: As a member of the Science and Technology Committee that compiled the report, I can say that the quotes are correct. However, I would interpret the report slightly differently from my hon. Friend. We cite, as Select Committees do, evidence that we receive. The only evidence that we received on this pointI remember reading itwas from the Scottish Council on Human Bioethics, which is a mixed body. The council is not exclusively religious, but it is not recognised as a body that has the status of a peer review scientific or academic organisation. We noted what it said, but we did not share its conclusion. Its conclusion was that much stronger restrictions were needed. We merely pointed out a statement of the obvious, and the position was shared by the Academy of Medical Sciences. The academys report says that there needs to be risk-management procedures appropriate to the status of the scientific knowledge about the risks. There are already those procedures in labs and we welcomed the Governments response on that. Again, we stated the obvious, that there needs to be risk management. I share my hon. Friends view that this should be a probing amendment because whatever the risk management procedures are, treating this as a genetically modified crop does not seem to be the appropriate practical measure and runs the risk of allowing other people to argue that the issue is being trivialised, which is not the intention.
As far as I am aware, environmental release of human admixed embryos is not envisaged in any laboratory. While I am delighted that the Science and Technology Committee report has been citedand cited accuratelythe conclusions that my hon. Friend draws are not necessarily the ones that we would need to draw.

Mark Simmonds: Despite the disparity of interpretation of the Select Committee quotes by the two hon. Gentlemen, can the Minister clarify whether this amendment, if it were to be included in the Bill, would undermine the special status of the embryo, which is the cornerstone of this particular piece of legislation?

Dawn Primarolo: Let me answer that question. Yes, it would undermine the legislation, and I shall explain why. It conflates two different issues. Genetically modified human embryos are presently excluded from regulation on genetic modification of organisms in the Environmental Protection Act 1990. The 1990 Act regulates the use of genetically modified organisms for the purpose of preventing or minimising any damage to the environment, which may arise from the escape or release from human control of genetically modified organisms.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether an embryo or human admixed embryo could cause damage to the environment if it was released. The answer is an unequivocal no. A pre-14-day embryo would be incapable of entering into the ecosystem as it would be insufficiently developed to survive. However, safeguards are provided. Clause 60 ensures that genetically modified human admixed embryos are excluded but that they are properly regulated in protocols and research laboratories with regard to their disposal. The clause prevents dual regulation that is not necessary and ensures that the HFEA requires centres to have a documented procedure for disposal of embryos, which is appropriate and takes into account the special status of human embryos. Therefore, it is a different set of requirements. I hope that I have clarified why we do not need the cross reference. I trust that the hon. Member for Southport is satisfied by my explanation and will withdraw the probing amendment.

John Pugh: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 61 to 65 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 7

Minor and consequential amendments

Amendment proposed: No. 105, in schedule 7, page 99, line 24, at end insert
2A In section 7 of the 1990 Act (reports to Secretary of State) for subsection (1) substitute
(1) The Authority shall prepare
(a) a report for the period beginning with the 1 August preceding the relevant commencement date (or if that date is a 1 August, beginning with that date) and ending with the next 31 March, and
(b) a report for each succeeding period of 12 months ending with 31 March.
(1A) In subsection (1)(a) the relevant commencement date means the day on which paragraph 2A of Schedule 7 to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 comes into force.
(1B) The Authority shall send each report to the Secretary of State as soon as practicable after the end of the period for which it is prepared..[Dawn Primarolo.]

Mark Simmonds: It would be helpful if, when responding to my brief contribution, the Minister will explain the amendment. My understanding is that it will merely necessitate a report being produced by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority to the Secretary of State. I want to be sure that the annual report will be a public document and that it will be available for scrutiny, hopefully at the appropriate time for debate in Parliament. I clarify that the necessity to produce a report is not insisted on under the 1990 Act. It is a new provision that has been inserted into the Bill.

Dawn Primarolo: Section 7 of the 1990 Act requires the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority to produce an annual report. Currently, section 7(1) requires a report covering the year from August to July, reflecting the fact that the HFEA came into operation on 1 August 1991. The amendment is a technical, administrative provision. The Treasurys financial reporting manual requires non-departmental public bodies, such as the HFEA, to produce an annual report to accompanying the bodys annual accounts.
It is therefore practical that we amend the reporting period to cover the financial year April to March, in line with the requirements of financial reporting manuals. It is a purely administrative requirement. There will be no change to the requirement that the Secretary of State lays the annual report or any other report under the schedule before Parliament. There has never been a requirement that the report will automatically be put down for debate, but it must be laid before Parliament after which time it will be open through the normal procedure in Parliament for hon. Members to debate it. Because such a change was not worth making in legislation in its own right, we are making such an amendment now to bring matters into line.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 106, in schedule 7, page 99, line 27, at end insert
 In section 14A of the 1990 Act (conditions of licences: human application), in subsection (1)
(a) omit the and at the end of paragraph (a), and
(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert , and
(c) every licence under paragraph 3 of that Schedule, so far as authorising activities in connection with the derivation from embryos of stem cells that are intended for human application...
No. 107, in schedule 7, page 99, line 27, at end insert
 In section 15 of the 1990 Act (conditions of research licences) after subsection (4) insert
(5) If by virtue of paragraph 15F of Schedule 3 (existing cell lines) qualifying cells, as defined by paragraph 15F(2) of that Schedule, of a person (P) are used to bring about the creation in vitro of an embryo or human admixed embryo without Ps consent, steps shall be taken to ensure that the embryo or human admixed embryo cannot subsequently be attributed to P..
No. 108, in schedule 7, page 100, leave out line 1 and insert
(1) Section 31A of the 1990 Act (the Authoritys register of licences) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1)
(a) omit the and at the end of paragraph (a), and
(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert , and
(c) every licence under paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 authorising activities in connection with the derivation from embryos of stem cells that are intended for human application..
(3) In.
No. 109, in schedule 7, page 100, line 41, at end insert
(4ZB) A person under the age of 16 years shall have legal capacity to consent to the use of the persons human cells in accordance with Schedule 3 to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 for the purposes of a project of research where the person is capable of understanding the nature of the research; and in this subsection human cells has the same meaning as in that Schedule..
No. 110, in schedule 7, page 101, line 28, at end insert
84B Application to use of human cells to create an embryo in vitro without adults consent
(1) The use of an adults human cells to bring about the creation in vitro of an embryo or human admixed embryo for use for the purposes of a project of research
(a) without the adults consent, and
(b) where the adult is incapable,
is to be treated as an intervention in the affairs of an adult under this Act.
(2) Sections 2 to 5, 8, 11, 14 and 85 of this Act apply to decisions made under paragraphs 15B and 15D of Schedule 3 to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (when consent to the use of human cells is not required due to adult being incapable of consenting) as they apply to decisions taken for the purposes of this Act.
(3) Section 51 of this Act does not apply to the use of an adults human cells to bring about the creation in vitro of an embryo or human admixed embryo for use for the purposes of a project of research.
(4) Section 83 of this Act applies to a decision made under paragraphs 15B and 15D of Schedule 3 to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 as if the person making the decision were exercising powers under this Act.
(5) Expressions used in this section and in Schedule 3 to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 have the same meaning in this section as in that Schedule..
No. 111, in schedule 7, page 102, line 14, after embryo) insert
or would require such consent but for paragraphs 15B and 15F of that Schedule.
No. 112, in schedule 7, page 102, line 18, leave out from beginning to in in line 21 and insert
requirements imposed by Schedule 3 to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.
No. 113, in schedule 7, page 102, line 28, at end insert
or would require such consent but for paragraphs 15B and 15F of that Schedule.
No. 114, in schedule 7, page 102, line 34, at end insert

Mental Capacity Act 2005 (c. 9)
In section 30 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (research), after subsection (3) insert
(3A) Research is not intrusive to the extent that it consists of the use of a persons human cells to bring about the creation in vitro of an embryo or human admixed embryo, or the subsequent storage or use of an embryo or human admixed embryo so created.
(3B) Expressions used in subsection (3A) and in Schedule 3 to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (consents to use or storage of gametes, embryos or human admixed embryos etc.) have the same meaning in that subsection as in that Schedule..[Dawn Primarolo.]

Schedule 7, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 8

Repeals and revocations

Amendments made: No. 115, in schedule 8, page 103, column 2, leave out lines 15 and 16 and insert
In section 12
(a) in subsection (1)(c), the words or non-medical fertility services, and
(b) in subsection (2), the word and at the end of paragraph (a)..
No. 116, in schedule 8, page 103, line 21, column 2, at end insert
In section 14A(1), the word and at the end of paragraph (a)..
No. 117, in schedule 8, page 103, line 26, column 2, at end insert
In section 31A(1), the word and at the end of paragraph (a)..[Dawn Primarolo.]

Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 67

Extent

Amendment made: No. 62, in clause 67, page 52, line 9, at end insert
( ) Subsection (2) is subject to paragraph A1(2) of Schedule 6..[Dawn Primarolo.]

Clause 67, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 68

Commencement

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

John Pugh: I have a question about new clause 7, which has been tabled, but tabled too late. I am advised that it would be appropriate to raise that issue at this stage. If I am wrong, I stand to be corrected.
I simply wanted clarification about the whole thrust of the legislationwhat is banned and what is not? It is fairly clear that the Bill bans placing animal gametes in a woman, placing human admix embryos and animal embryos in a woman, placing human embryos in an animal and placing human admix embryos in an animal. However, neither the 1990 Act nor the Bill expressly ban the placing of human gametes in an animal. There may be a good reason for thatperhaps to allow the possibility of human ovarian tissue being matured or whateverbut the legislative loophole, if it is one, would also allow the potential development of a human or part-human embryo in a non-human primate, by a gamete intra-fallopian transfer. That loophole has been spotted. If it is not a loophole, I would be grateful for any clarification that the Minister can give on the issue.

Jimmy Hood: Order. The hon. Gentleman has raised a question about a new clause that was not selected, so the Minister need not respond, unless she wishes to.

Dawn Primarolo: I shall write to the hon. Gentleman.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Short title

Dawn Primarolo: I beg to move amendment No. 63, in clause 69, page 52, line 31, leave out subsection (2).
The amendment removes the privilege amendment that was made in another place. As hon. Members are aware, the financial powers of the other place are restricted by the rights and privileges of the House and by the Parliament Acts. As the Bill originated in another place and contains financial provisions, a privilege amendment was added to the Bill before its introduction in the House, to ensure that the House financial privileges were not infringed. It is therefore necessary to have a purely technical amendment to remove the privilege amendment, which provided that nothing in the Bill should impose or vary any charge on the people or public funds. It is a straightforward requirement under parliamentary rules.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 69, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 1

Birth certificates in cases involving assisted reproduction
The Secretary of State shall by regulation make provision for the birth certificate of a person born as a consequence of
(a) treatment services other than basic partner treatment services, or
(b) the procurement and distribution of any sperm (other than partner-donated sperm that has not been stored) in the course of providing non-medical fertility services,
to indicate these facts, either through
(a) a symbol to denote the fact of donor conception, or
(b) the provision of a detailed birth certificate to include the fact of donor conception and an abridged certificate that does not..[Mark Simmonds.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mark Simmonds: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause relates to the complex issue of birth certificates, which we touched on earlier. In the context of the debate surrounding part 2, new clause 1 relates to some of the issues raised when we discussed schedule 6. The new clause would ensure that the Secretary of State made regulations either to annotate a birth certificate or to provide two versionsas the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East suggested earlier in todays proceedings. The Minister explained the Governments view that there should be a four-year period of reflection, although if possible they should report earlier. I think that that is too long, and that we should get clarity as fast as possible.
There are significant issues surrounding birth certificates, and I would like to make a point about the new clause on the record. The welfare of the child should be paramount in the consideration of these issues, and it is important that the Secretary of State holds detailed consultations about this, particularly as regards the changes in the Bill. There are some anomalies. For example, if an unmarried couple, who may have known each other for only a short period, are treated with donated sperm, they are both recorded on the birth certificate as parents. However, a same-sex couple in a civil partnership are not both listed as parents and the woman who did not give birth to the child would have to adopt it in order to have any legal claim. Under the proposals, at least theoretically, although I suspect that in a small number of circumstances it could be the reality, neither of the people named on the birth certificatemother and father or mother and other parentwill have a genetic link to the child.
The fulcrum of the debate is whether the birth certificate should be primarily a biological or a social record. That throws up all sorts of issues and the interesting thing is that the bodies that represent the donor-conceived communityif I can call it thathave differing opinions that are almost inversely opposed, and that makes these arguments even more complicated. I would like to suggest why the fulcrum should be moved towards the biological end of the spectrum, rather than the social end. Earlier, we discussed genetic diseases. That subject will become more and more prevalent and important as medical and scientific advancements take place and there is a greater understanding of inherited diseases, such as cancer and others that we have mentioned, which we hope will be circumvented by mitochondrial and other technologies.
Another issue is the deception of the state, and someone knowingly connivingI use that word in its softest sensein trying to remove the childs genetic parentage from the birth certificate. There is the issue of sperm donors and donor anonymity, and the point raised earlier by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon about donors having the choice to remain anonymous was pertinent. Inappropriate marriages may occur if people do not know, or at least have an indication, about their genetic history, and that goes back to some of the debates that we had about the age for obtaining the information from the HFEA.
Discrimination is another issue. Refusing to mark the birth certificates of those who are donor conceived, yet allowing two women to be shown as the parents of a child, inevitably makes a clear distinction between the two types of donor-conceived people. There are those who are donor conceived and for whom the information is made publictwo women clearly cannot be the biological parentsand those for whom the information is not shown on their birth certificate. That seems to be an anomaly. The new clause, which I accept is not perfect, attempts to put on the record the great concern and strength of feeling about this issue.
Personally, I favour the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East of a dual birth certificate, although I accept that that could be bureaucratic. I see the sensitivities of people who might not want to have it marked on their birth certificate that they were donor conceived. They may think that an infringement of privacywhy should someone have to produce that information when applying for a passport, or whatever birth certificates are used for? However, it is important that a child has an understanding, wherever possible, of their genetic make-up. A child should not necessarily have to wait until the age of 18 to understand that they are donor-conceived, although most parents do make an attempt to inform the child about such matters.
There is conflicting legal opinion on this matter. There are questions about how the human rights of the child and the right to health safeguards in the United Nations convention on the rights of the child will be met if a child is brought up without the requisite knowledge to avoid particular health consequences. It is important for healthy family life that genetic defects and intermarriage of relatives are avoided if at all possible. There is a real danger that, unless some solution is found to this complex problem, we will exacerbate an already difficult issue.

Robert Key: I endorse entirely what my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness has said. I would like to press him a little and to concentrate on the second paragraph (b) in the new clause, on the provision of a detailed birth certificate.
I am grateful to a number of organisations and individuals who have been in touch with methe partnership focus group, the British Association of Social Workers Project Group on Assisted Reproduction, and the Donor Conception Network, to name but three. I am particularly grateful to Professor Eric Blyth, professor of social work at the university of Huddersfield, with whom I have had some correspondence on this matter. It seems to me that, in view of the discussion in the other place and what my hon. Friend has said, there is a problem that we must crack with the short birth certificate and the so-called long birth certificate. In the other place no proposal has been made that does not involve extra bureaucracy, which would risk compromising the privacy of parents or donor-conceived people, or other members of their family. The principle risk to privacy is the fact that birth certificates are public documents. Not only is the long birth certificate, which provides details of the individuals parents, increasingly required for a range of legal and other purposes, but anyone who is armed with minimal information and prepared to pay a modest fee can obtain a copy of the long birth certificate of any other person in the country. I shall not repeat what I said earlier about the discussion in the other place, but I wonder if my hon. Friend would agree that all certificates of birthin other words, the short birth certificatecould include this text:
Further information relating to the individual whose birth is recorded on the certificate may be held on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority register of information, the parental order register or the adopted children register.
All certified copies of an entry pursuant to the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953in other words, the long birth certificatecould have this text:
Further information relating to the individual whose birth is recorded on this certificate may be held on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority register of information.
Adopted people and people subject to a parental order as a result of a surrogacy arrangement already have an adoption certificate or a parental order certificate, respectively, in lieu of a long birth certificate, clearly indicating their status. The proposal I am making would mean that all individuals had access to a birth certificate that alerted them to the existence of other registers. It would not single out any one individual or, by implication, their parents or family members; everybody would have this. Thus, the information could act as a trigger for the individual to make their own inquiries of the registers, subject to the legally mandated age limits for accessing such information. Both in advance of undergoing a donor procedure and as part of the new provisions for parent education, adults who are contemplating building their family through donor conception would in the future receive a clear message about the merits of early disclosure and would be advised about the new text on birth certificates. That would provide parents with an added incentive for early disclosure, rather than risking later and possibly traumatic disclosure. That seems to be something that both Houses have thought is the best way forward.

Brian Iddon: I have given this a lot of thought, but it seems to me that the hon. Gentlemans proposal would increase the bureaucracy that he was trying to avoid by the previous suggestion. Most of us would want to know whether other information was available. We would want access to all those registers to find out whether we were donor conceived and to see whether they contained other information about us. That would result in a huge bureaucracy.

Robert Key: If that information was available online, it would not. I do not see a problem. However, that is the sort of detail that will have to be looked into. I do not have the answer.

Brian Iddon: Most of us are concerned about the privacy of the individuals and their parents. Making the information available online would not get around the objections that most of us have to putting marks on the short birth certificate.

Robert Key: I accept that argument. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right; we should not go there. However, it does not destroy the argument that it would be a way of indicating on everybodys birth certificate where they might seek further information if there was any doubt. Its other great virtue is that it would undoubtedly put some pressure on parents to come clean about their childrens origins.

John Pugh: Having had the chance to reflect on our earlier debate, I accept some of the concerns of donor networks that knowing about someones genetic origins is not in the public interest, except in rare circumstances. I can imagine that those conducting a research project into the effect of the environment versus inheritance would justifiably feel miffed if some of those who were the subject of research for public health purposes turned out not to be the persons who they thought had been genetically identified. Except in extreme cases, there is no genuine public interest in the public, the employer or anyone else having access to information about a persons origins. In a sense, the birth certificate is giving away the fact that there has been a donor conception.
However, many people accept that individuals have a right to know about their genetic inheritance. To put it another way, it is wrong in all but the most exceptional cases to withhold that information or to mislead people about it. Although there is a sort of abstract rightone can make inquiries if one thinks there is reason to do sowe have a real right to know our genetic inheritance, and we have the capacity to exercise it.
It also involves someone else having the duty to disclose that information, but who is that someone else? The onus could be put on the parents or the state, but none the less someone ought to have a duty of disclosure. We are struggling with how to balance that duty with other legitimate rightsto privacy, to an undisrupted family life and so onbut neither we nor the Government have a solution that adequately addresses that problem.
The Minister said that the Government were going to think about the matter, with a review lasting more than four years. It may take four years to come up with an adequate solution, but we should not pretend that there is not a problemand the Bill does not solve it.

Dawn Primarolo: The hon. Member for Southport summed up the problem very well. The Committee is strugglingthree suggestions have been made on how it might be solved during this short debateto understand how we can balance obligations to the donor, the parents and the donor-conceived child. The hon. Member for Salisbury said that the point of thisif I am wrong, I am sure he will correct mewas to ensure that we kept up the pressure and encouraged parents to be truthful to the children from the beginning. I concur with that view; it represents everything that the Government are trying to do. We can all quote influential groups that take a different view about why the birth certificate should be annotated and why the new clause should be accepted, although some might go further, taking the view that it is counterproductive and would work against the objective pointed out by the hon. Member for Salisbury.
I pray in aid the Royal College of Nursing, which commented specifically on the new clause rather than speculating about what it might mean. The RCN made it clear that it supported the Governments position as stated in another place, because we needed to be clear about what we required clinics to do, who must be notified, how any annotations on birth certificates must be provided, and where the obligations lie. The RCN ended up in the same place as the hon. Member for Salisbury. It decided that it was best for the parents themselves to tell the children.
Looking at some of the other stakeholders, it is not just the Royal College of Nursing, a considerable and influential organisation that supports the Governments position. The Donor Conception Network, which represents donor-conceived children and their parents, also does, and has said so in submissions to Committee members with regard to birth certificates. The Donor Conception Network goes further. It starts by agreeing absolutelyagain, who would not?with the proposition made by the hon. Member for Salisbury, which is that if children are donor-conceived, their parents should communicate that important information when they think it appropriate and by a definite time, after which children have a right to know provided for in legislation.
However, the Donor Conception Network goes on to say that it is concerned that a move to annotate birth certificates, in whatever fashion, may be counter-productive. Parents who planned to tell their children about the details of their conception may decide when registering the birth not to give those details to the registrar because they do not want that sensitive information made public. They may find it much harder to tell the child if they have not been as open as they should be.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, South-East suggested that two birth certificates might be the way forward, but the Donor Conception Network takes the view, and I agree strongly, that it is necessary for the Government to evaluate certain pieces of work alongside the review in order to come to an understanding and proceed. That involves the Donor Conception Networks planned programme of work, which is supported by the Department of Health, to promote telling children at an early age that they are donor-conceived. The network is working directly with parents to understand the concerns and barriers, and what is necessary to move forward. The networks programme is concerned with non-identifying informationjust the straightforward fact that children are donor-conceived. We can all understand the importance of the rights of donors and of guaranteed anonymity.
Going further, the Department is funding a second project that will work with prospective parents hoping to conceive using donated gametes. Again, we seek to understand clearly what the barriers are and what can be done to help. It is entirely reasonable to say, in what we have all said is a difficult and sensitive matter, that we should pilot and evaluate such work to ensure that we have the best way to communicate with parents and prospective parents. We should get the feedback of information from it, include it within the review on birth certificates and what should be on them and come to the right conclusion. A decision made in haste might not be the right one. We might end up cutting across the important principle, identified by the hon. Member for Salisbury, of parents informing, explaining and discussing issues with their donor-conceived children.
That is why the Government continue to resist putting any compulsion in the Bill to move now. We think that it is sensible to collect the information, speak directly to those concerned, and make a judgement on that basis and no other. I hope that the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness will not press his new clause to a vote, but if he does, with regret and for the best of reasons, I will ask my hon. Friends to oppose it.

Mark Simmonds: I am grateful to all those who contributed to the debate on new clause 1. My hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury made some very pertinent points and some of the issues that he mentioned about the Ministers review deserve much more detail and consideration. Todays exchange demonstrates the difficulties in coming to a conclusion. I understand and accept that, but none the less I do not regret having tabled the new clause for debate and discussion; it is important for us to put such concerns, however complex and challenging, on the record.
I am not convinced that the Minister should be prepared to accept a four-year time period in which this should be reviewed. Pressure should be put on whoever is responsible for that review to come to a conclusion, in consultation with the necessary people, in a much shorter time scale. I was also intrigued by the Ministers defence and praying in aid outside organisations to defend the Governments position, as there does not seem to be one. The Governments position seems to be that this is complex and that there should be a review that reports in four years time.
I understand why many organisationsthose who represent donors and others such as the Royal College of Nursingdo not support the second (a) in new clause 1 about placing
a symbol to denote the fact of donor conception
on the original birth certificate. I understand and agree with that, but I felt that without that in the new clause, we would not be able to debate the specific issue.
Of course, the priority must be for parents to inform their children about their origins, in consultation with counselling and other facilities that are available. However, I also think that very detailed consideration must be given to the necessity, where possible, of allowing a child to understand their genetic make up and where they come from as early as possible. A sensible and easy way of doing that is through some mechanism such as an extended birth certificate or via access to other information. I will withdraw new clause 1, but I would like to reserve the right to return to the issue on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Further general functions of Authority
In section 8(1) of the 1990 Act (general functions of the Authority) after paragraph (a) insert
(aa) give advice or make submissions to the Parliamentary Human Fertilisation and Embryology Committee established under section (Parliamentary Human Fertilisation and Embryology Committee) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008,..[Dr. Iddon.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Brian Iddon: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Jimmy Hood: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 6Parliamentary Human Fertilisation and Embryology Committee
(1) There shall be a Committee of Members of both Houses of Parliament, to be called the Parliamentary Human Fertilisation and Embryology Committee, to consider human fertilisation, embryology and related ethical issues, and to make recommendations.
(2) The Committee shall have power to send for persons, papers and records, to report from time to time, and to appoint specialist advisers either to supply information which is not readily available or to elucidate matters of complexity within the Committees order of reference.
(3) The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Committee shall consist of fifteen members of the House of Lords nominated by the Lord Speaker and fifteen members of the House of Commons nominated by the Speaker of the House of Commons, to be appointed on the passing of this Act to serve for the duration of the present Parliament and thereafter to be appointed at the commencement of each Parliament to service for the duration of that Parliament.
(4) Any causal vacancy occurring by the reason of the death, resignation, or incapacity of a member of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Committee shall be filled by the nomination of a member by the Lord Speaker or the Speaker of the House of Commons, as the case may be.
(5) The powers and duties of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Committee may be exercised and discharged by any twelve members thereof, and the Committee shall be entitled to sit and transact business whether Parliament be sitting or not, and notwithstanding a vacancy in the membership of the Committee.
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Committee may regulate its own procedure..

Brian Iddon: I move the new clause in my name and those of my hon. Friends the Members for Brighton, Kemptown and for Norwich, North.
There was an expectancy in the other place that this House would give guidance on the proposal to create a national human bioethics committee. On Second Reading in this House there was, unfortunately, little or no discussion about that proposal. In her closing speech in the discussion, Baroness Royall of Blaisdon said:
The Government have made clear their view that there is value in the consideration of bioethical issues in Parliament. We said as much in our response to the committee of both Houses that scrutinised the draft version of this Bill, which recommended the establishment of a parliamentary standing committee on bioethics.
She went on:
The Government see merit in a parliamentary standing committee on bioethics but do not see a national human bioethics commission as the way ahead.[Official Report, House of Lords, 28 January 2008; Vol. 698, c. 500.]
Is it right that the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authoritythe HFEAa quango, makes major ethical decisions, mainly without consulting the rest of us, and especially not Parliament? That is not to say that I am not grateful, however, for all the thought that the HFEA has given to bioethical issues in this policy area. Nevertheless, it has been difficult for it on occasions, and it has sometimes made the wrong decision, in my opinion, which it has occasionally reversed after further consideration and in the light of more evidence.
Personally, I would like to see a parliamentary bioethics committee established to consider all bioethical issues, relating to animals or humans. I have tabled these two amendments to sound out right hon. and hon. Members of this Committee today, and to seek the views of my right hon. Friend the Minister. The amendments have been framed in a narrower way than I would have preferred, so that they stand within the scope of the Bill.
The chief medical officer, Professor Sir Liam Donaldson, told the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee for this Bill:
We have had, generally, in this country a deficit in medical ethics, both in the input into some of our decisions over the years, and also, in medical ethicists.
On 28 January 2008, Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws, who chaired the Human Genetics Commission for eight years, said in the other place:
I felt there was a discomfort in some of those issues being with the HFEA, which is seen by the public as a regulatory body. It is confusing to have the regulatory function and an advisory function on ethics combined".[Official Report, House of Lords, 29 January 2008; Vol. 698, c. 490.]
I share her discomfort.
Alan Doran, acting chief executive of the HFEA, told a symposium at the BioCentre in November 2007:
We do not claim to be a National Bioethics Committee. We are not a body whose primary function is to resolve ethical issues. I do not think the HFEA was set up as an ethics commission.
Some opponents of the establishment of a national or parliamentary human bioethical committee have pointed out the existence of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, which is financed by the Nuffield Foundation and the Wellcome Trust. However, it decides on the topics of debate, not Parliament.
A number of other organisations also cover bioethics, including the Genetic Interest Group, the British Medical Association, which publishes Medical Ethics Today, the General Medical Councils standards and ethics committee; the Royal Society of Medicine, and the Academy of Medical Sciences. I should also mention the Scottish Council on Bioethics, to which reference has already been made today in this Committee. Again, these organisations do not dance to the tune of Parliament, but they are a valuable source of information.
With respect to research, we should not forget the important role that local medical ethics committees play. We could consider that there is a double lock on research of this kind, one local lock, and one national lock, namely, the HFEA. None of those bodies, however, is responsible for making the law, as we are.
Governments or Ministers have established national bioethics committees in a number of other countries, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland, as well as Australia and the USA. However, we must be a little cautious when national committees are created in that way. I cite, for example, what has happened to the US committee. It has become very politicised, if one looks at its proceedings.
Indeed, in its 2005 report entitled Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, the former House of Commons Science and Technology Committee recommended the formation of
a single commission to develop policy issues relating to assisted reproduction, embryo research and human genetics.
For right hon. and hon. Members who wish to establish a national human bioethics commission, I recommend that they read Baroness Warnocks arguments against the proposal in the 2008 Whitsun edition of Science in Parliament, which has recently arrived on hon. Members desks, and in TheObserver of 13 January 2008. Referring to a parliamentary human bioethics committee, she said in The Observer that
the overriding merit of establishing such a committee, rather than a new commission, is that it would be a recognised part of parliamentary procedure, often part of that procedure that leads to the passage of a law.
In conclusion to her piece, Baroness Warnock said:
I believe that setting up a new style of committee
she was referring to a national human bioethics commission
independent of Parliament would seem to make the role of Parliament less central, its responsibility and its authority less great. That would, in my view, be an actual weakening of the rule of law.
I happen to agree with her views.
I am informed that setting up a parliamentary human bioethics committee, or a committee of the type mentioned in my amendments, is not a legislative issue. Perhaps the Minister can confirm that. However, setting up a national bioethics commission, I believe, would require an amendment to the Bill, but I am against such a proposal. Of course, ad hoc committees have been established in Parliament before to consider bioethical issues. Lord Walton of Detchant, for example, chaired a Select Committee on Medical Ethics from 1992 to 1993, which considered the law on euthanasia and assisted suicide.
In conclusion, I believe that we should have a statutory, human bioethics committee to consider the difficult issues that we have looked at today and during the passage of the Bill through Parliament. I look forward to hearing the views of the Committee on the issue, including those of my right hon. Friend the Minister.

Robert Key: I strongly endorse the comments of the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East. I served on the Select Committee to which he referred in the last Parliament. The inquiry into human reproductive technologies and the law visited both Sweden and Italy and met their national bioethics committees. In Italy I was quickly aware that the committee was not what it seemedseemed to me, anyhow. I think that I recall, for example, that there was only one woman on the committee, which reflected the political reality of Italian democracy, but convinced me that it was not a satisfactory way of proceeding in this country. I also recall that when the Joint Committee scrutinised the Bill last summer and produced our report, the Government listened. The Government took us seriously. They gave the Bill a new title and binned a huge chunk of their proposals. That surely shows the virtue of such a Committee. I commend the Government for listening to Parliament.
Both Houses of Parliament are, de facto, the national bioethics committee of this country. We should be jealous of that. It would not be possible to create another body, independent of Parliament, that would have anything like the authority that we have, with the authority of democratically elected Members, representing every constituency in the country, together with the authority of the men and women in another place, who have come there via a variety of routes, which may evolve in the future. However, we have a de facto national bioethics commission in Parliament itself. We now need to find how to establish a new Joint Committee, which would be a Standing Committee, like the Joint Committee on Human Rights or some such body, which would sit for the duration of a Parliament and would be made up of members nominated, as they are for existing Joint Committees, by the Leaders of both Houses.
At the other end of the spectrum, I endorse what the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East said about local medical ethics committees. I do not think that members of the public generally realise that in every hospital or clinical research establishment there is a local ethics committee which considers all the factors as they are legislated for and played out in their local communities and establishments. They are extraordinarily influential bodies, and they are localised to a degree that makes them credible to our constituents at a local level.
That is the approach that we ought to take in future. We should not rely on the setting up of a joint Committee for the pre-legislative scrutiny of a particular bit of legislation; we should have a permanent Standing Committee of both Houses to deal with such bioethical issues, which will only get more complicated and arise more frequently. It will not be another 18 years before more legislation. Mark my words, Mr. Hood: we will be back within 10, maybe five years, because something else will have happened. Medical technology and science will have moved forward so fast that once again Parliament will have to catch up. The voice of Parliament should set the ethical and moral framework and the regulatory authority should decide on individual cases within it. That is the way we should be going, and that is why I strongly support the new clause.

Ian Gibson: I, too, support the new clause. I do not think that there will be any problem with the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, which has done lots of work that I shall explain in a minute. It is quite independent, is financed independently and does fine work.
In the Joint Committee, while we were discussing the Bill, high-octane meetings were held with people from the Lords and the Commonseveryone who had some ethical view about everythingand it was good to have the opportunity to talk about things. There was nothing more tendentious than the need for a father. That evoked some heavy stuff, and there was a lot of disagreement on both sides, but it was important to have that debate. We have never had such a debate properly in Select Committees and so on, because there just aint time. We need a place to discuss those issues.
I could say lots about bioethics. It is the fastest growing profession in the medical world at the moment. People are suddenly realising more and more that biology and the biological sciences are developing new technologies and ideas that will have to be considered in terms of societynot just this society but other societies, such as in the developing world and so on. I think that such a Committee would have a lot to say. Some of the things that it would look at include genetic screening and age discrimination. When do we start and stop breast screening? Do doctors behave differently depending on the age of the patient in front of them? I think that I know, but I will not say it here. A lot of discrimination goes on. There are also ethical and legal issues involving human tissue that we have discussed here, such as animal-to-human transplants or xeno-transplantationthe odd bit of pig appears in peoples aortas during some treatmentsmental disorders and so on.

Jimmy Hood: Order. As we are getting to the end of the Committee, I ask the hon. Gentleman to stay in order when addressing the Committee.

Ian Gibson: Then, of course, there are stem cells and so on, and pharmacogeneticsit is almost a continual processand the DNA database. There has never been a more important arena. More and more information is being brought to our notice. We need a place where people can contemplate and think about those issues and build them into hard science and medicine. I am glad to support the idea of a joint bioethics Committee in this place.

John Pugh: I warmed to the proposal when it was mentioned on Second Reading, but since then, scepticism has grown on me. I accept that the remit should be wider than defined in the new clause and that the HFEA, the Nuffield Council or whoever do not actually do the jobs envisaged by those who tabled the new clause. Most ethical committees, as I understand them, are basically endowed with a set of principles that they apply with respect to a certain group of professionals. What I think that we are asking for, implicitly, is a bioethics commission, parliamentary or otherwise, to formulate a set of principles to take us out of the moral mire that we are in.
Generally, ethics is a tricky business. I have spent a lot of my life studying it from the philosophical point of view. There is no agreement about what it is or how ethical disputes should be resolved, even where consensus has arisen. For example, in the Warnock report, Baroness Warnock states clearly that she applied utilitarian principles to resolve the moral dilemmas. But if we are not utilitarians, we would simply not buy into that in the first place. There is nothing blindingly obvious with the moral consensus that we have at present, but there might be a pious hope that we can have a bioethics group and, through that, a consensus or solution from a group of moral experts who will just tell us what framework we need to work within.
The existence of moral experts has been a matter of debate since the time of Plato and it is still yet to be resolved.

Ian Gibson: He is not here at the moment.

John Pugh: No, he is not, nor is anyone who we can be assured knows what is good and what is right. A group of moral experts does not get Members of Parliament off any moral hoof of thinking ethically ourselves. If we think of the committee as a mechanism for reflecting ethical opinion, encouraging ethical debate or ensuring that decisions are made in an ethnically informed way as opposed to pragmaticallyI take on board the comment made by the hon. Member for Norwich, North about scientists not being purewe would have a modest committee that could do a useful job.
However, our difficulty, which no committee can resolve in connection with the legislation, is that we are not working within a clear, ethical framework. There is no clear ethical thread binding all the various moral decisions that are made in the context of the Bill. That is not only my view. I read the evidence presented to committees on draft legislation and the remarks of Professor Haldane and others, and that is exactly what they picked up. There is a series of ad hoc commissions and things that we believe are right on balance, and a series of case-by-case arguments, but if we went for the position that we wanted in respect of the Mental Health Bill and said, Here is a piece of legislation but, before we get into the detail, let us put in the Bill the moral principles that will guide us, and explained why we made various decisions in the clauses, we would be in serious difficulty. We would be incapable of taking such action, and many people who reported on the draft legislation said precisely that.
A bioethics committee that is prepared to fill a modest role might have a place in the mix. However, what we shall not achieveand perhaps what hon. Members are hoping foris a cast of modern Solomons. We might reach the position when people know why they are making such decisions, as a result of which ethical rationale would be laid out with greater clarity, but we would not achieve wholesale agreement on what is right unlessthis is the fear of some peoplewe rig the committee in such a way that it would be guaranteed consensus.
In the past, many of the debates on ethnical committees have been about whether they are set up fairly or whether the balance is such that the democratic verdict goes in one direction rather than another. I do not know how that can be resolved. A great deal of hard work has to be done. On the assumption that we have something that adds grist to the millthat adds something to the general picture and informs the decisions of Parliamentthere would be nothing wrong with it, but it will not take us out of our current bind of making hard, moral decisions for all time on particular issues.

Evan Harris: I declare an interest as a member of the British Medical Association medical ethics committee. The hon. Member for Salisbury mentioned local ethics committees. He is right; they are well developed in research ethics. I was a member of one of those committees for many years. They are moving on apace in respect of clinical ethics in hospitals.
I was on the same visit to Sweden and Italy to which the hon. Gentleman referred, and the system was not ideal. I support the thrust of the new clause, but I want to put it in the context of the Select Committees recommendation on human reproductive technologies and the law in 2005. The hon. Member for Bolton, South-East read out a recommendation. We argued that the HFEAs policy-making aspects and the Human Genetics Commission could be combined usefully in one commission that would advise a standing parliamentary committee.
The problem with the HFEAs current policy-making role, as some people see it, is at least twofold. First, because primary and secondary legislation can cover only a certain number of things, the HFEA is called upon currently and will be called upon under the Bill to develop policy in areas where there is not regulation and where it has discretion. The HFEA does its best to do that; I am not arguing that it has not done a good job, but because it does not have any of the antis, arguably there is not the same degree of debate in its policy-making committee, as opposed to its consultations, that we have here in Parliament.
The second problem is that, as a result of that lack of debate and the fact that the HFEA makes policy in sensitive areas, it is liable to be criticised by politicians. That is the nature of things; politicians criticise those whom we have set up and given the power to make decisions for us. Perhaps that is unfair, given that we have voted for a measure that gives the HFEA discretion to make policy. There was one occasion when the Science and Technology Committee criticised the HFEA for making a decision about pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. The Committee was provoked into doing that partly by the combative performance of the former chair of the HFEA, now Baroness Deech, my constituent. She is a woman whom I greatly respect, but she was quite combative and there was a critical report, which I thought was unfair because the HFEA was only doing what it had been asked to do in the 1990 Actto make policy.
To avoid that problem, one could have the best aspects of the HFEAs policy-making function combined with the Human Genetics Commission. It is hard to see a distinction between those two, and indeed, the Human Genetics Commission provided evidence and a view on hybrid embryos during the HFEAs consultation. The best elements of those could be combined into a committee or commission that gives advicea Standing Committee of Parliament. Such a Committee would have the advantages of being in Parliament. It would also, because of the way in which such things work, be able to capture all the strands of opinion, so that those, for example, who were not supportive of embryo research would not be excluded from policy development, which the HFEA has to deal with.
For those reasons, the Science and Technology Committee of 2005 was right in its report to say that the policy-making functions could be taken away from the HFEA, which could then concentrate on regulation and inspection, but that that was worth doing only in the context of a parliamentary Standing Committee. For the reasons that have been given in the debate already, there are huge advantages in creating such a Committee.
What would be the powers of such a Committee? Another Select Committee making recommendations mainly to the Government, which the Government felt they had a mandate to accept or reject as they saw fit would not be ideal. That is why a model like the Joint Committee on Human Rights is a good one. In its reports, the Joint Committee on Human Rights does not simply make recommendations to Government and other organisations as other Select Committees do; it gives specific advice to Parliament on human rights issues. In that sense, it goes beyond the normal role of a Select Committee and both Houses can choose to accept or reject its advice.
The second merit of the Joint Committee on Human Rights is that it was set up by statute. I do not know what advice the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East received, but it may not be possible within the scope of the Bill to give a Committee statutory functions. The Joint Committee on Human Rights does have statutory functions in respect of declarations of incompatibility by the European Court. The fact that it is statutory gives it authority; the fact that it is joint gives it authority, and the fact that it is a Standing Committee gives it authority, as well as the confidence and the staff to produce useful reports. We saw in the debates in this House yesterday and the day before that the Joint Committee on Human Rights has now gone further. Where a majority agree with a recommendation, members of the Committee are tabling amendments not in the name of the Committee but which reflect the recommendations of the Committee. The primary function of that Committee, other than its statutory one, is legislative scrutiny from a human rights perspective.
There are significant merits in the idea of a parliamentary ethics committee. It would enable Parliament to visit these issues on a more structured basis and far more regularly than we otherwise do. I do not share the confidence of the hon. Member for Salisbury that we will be back in five years with another Bill. I think that he is right that science will progress quickly in the next five yearsperhaps even in the field of IV-derived gametes, but I will not open that up again. Science will move on, but I suspect that we will not be able to come back in the next five years, or even 10 years. However, a parliamentary Standing Committee with authorityeven without statutory powerswould put pressure on the Government of the day to enable a free vote to take place, even if it had to make majority decisions. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Southport was right to say that there would never be unanimity, which would probably be unhealthy, on some of these fundamental issues. They are generally free vote issues so it is difficult for parties to seek a mandate at a general election and say, This is what we are going to do, because the matter would be subject to a free voterightly, in my opinionwhich requires that the Government do something. It is quite difficult to do that, for reasons of the parliamentary timetable, the pressure of legislation and that such measures contain yuck factors, which Governments run a mile from. It is to the Ministers credit that she has not run as fast as some Ministers might have, from taking on the issues. I am sure that she enjoyed the prospect of dealing with the Bill.
I do not think that we are in a moral mire. If we are, I think that we are climbing out of it with measures such as the new clause. There is a clear basis for establishing such a Standing Committee. Its remit should be wider than simply embryology. I accept the point made by the hon. Member for Norwich, North that it might have been difficult to raise the issue within the scope of the Bill if the Committee proposed in the amendment had not been restricted to embryology. If this is a probing amendment, I hope that the Minister is listening and will come back with a proposal that has the support of a number of Select Committees. I echo the view of the hon. Member for Salisbury that not only did the Joint Committee that considered the Bill do good work, as did the Science and Technology Committee on the hybrids issue, but that it was good that the Government listened and changed their position. They were not accused of a U-turn, but were applauded for listeningI repeat that. I pay tribute to all the members of the Joint Committee, especially the Chairman, my hon. Friend the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough (Mr. Willis), for his work.
Although I understand that the new clause is probing, I would like to associate myself strongly with the thinking behind it. I hope that we see something like the Committee that the hon. Gentleman proposes, to give Parliament the ability to debate emerging ethical issues transparentlyso that the public can see us debating itand with some effect .

Mark Simmonds: I would also like to express my sympathy for the new clause, although I am not sure that its wording is correct because it might have some knock-on effects, which the Minister will probably come to. I would like to explain three or four reasons why I am sympathetic to the general thrust of what the hon. Members for Bolton, South-East and for Norwich, North are trying to do.
First, clearly, if this Bill is to last as long as the 1990 Act18 yearsit is going to have to be amended by a subsequent series of regulations, provision for which is scattered through the Bill. As we have discussed, many of the regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, but we all know in the House that it is very rare, despite consultation, for regulations to be altered significantly. A Committee such as that proposed could have a remit of examining the regulations that are subsequently used to amend the Bill. That might be a reason for the Government not to want such a Committee, but I think that that, among other functions, would be a good remit for the Committee.
The second reason for looking carefully at such a Committee is that it would provide a positive and necessary link, both for the scientific community and for those concerned about the ethical issues that surround such complex areas. There is not a permanent body related to Parliament that has that specific role at the moment.
The third issue, which other hon. Members have touched upon, is that there is understandable discomfort with the HFEA operating in a vacuum and deciding and making up its own policyalmost as scientific developments occurbecause there is no other responsible body. Indeed, the point made by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon was absolutely right: there is not inevitably a balance on the HFEA to give the other side of the ethical dilemma of many of those scientific advances. That is another strong reason for looking at the concern closely.
The other issue, which was given as a defence as to why certain things are in the Bill, is that we are merely catching up with scientific advancements that the HFEA has already approved. That is primarily because no detailed discussion from an ethical position has taken place in Parliament since the passing of the 1990 Act, although obviously regulations have been discussed in Committee. That provides another very powerful reason for why the Committee should be set up.
Three or four difficult areas must be addressed with regard to the remit of the Committee. The first is the ethical balance of who will sit on it. I strongly believe that the Committee should be made up of parliamentarians. It should not be extended beyond that for the reasons set out clearly by the hon. Member for Bolton, South-East. The size of the Committee must be carefully considered.

Michael Penning: My hon. Friend makes the good point that the Committee should be made up of parliamentarians. However, with the greatest respect, it should not be made up of the usual suspects. Its members should not be those who have always sat on Committees considering such matters. It must reflect a broad view from within the House.

Mark Simmonds: My hon. Friend makes a sensible point. Having said that, there is a balance to strike. If such a Committee were set up, it would be important for people with expertise, knowledge and experience to be on it, as well as those who could bring fresh ideas and thoughts. I would a view a Committee of around 30 members, both from this House and the other place, as too large to co-ordinate in any sensible way.
We must also do some detailed thinking about the remit and standing of the Committee and its purpose and scope. What will it scrutinise, who will it advise, and on what basis? It is a very strong argument that if we want the Bill to survive for a long period, there must be a body based around Parliament that has democratic accountability and that provides ethical and scientific analysis as scientific advancement takes place.
My final point is that after the next general election, the Minister will have a lot more time on her hands. She might wish to participate significantly in such a Committee.

Dawn Primarolo: Well, at least the hon. Gentleman acknowledges that I have a safe seat.
A number of issues have been raised, some of which I agree with and some of which I do not. I will try and proceed through the points. We all echo the point made by the hon. Member for Salisbury and my hon. Friends the Members for Bolton, South-East and for Norwich, North about the importance of Parliament deciding. We are elected to come to terms with, and decide on, inevitably very important issues on behalf of our constituents. The issues raised about matters of embryology, for instancealthough that is not the only ethical issueare matters that we as Members of Parliament must consider.
On a number of occasions during consideration of the Bill, through the review of the 1990 Act and during pre-legislative scrutiny, there has been a debate about whether we should have a wider bioethics commission, and whether that should be independent of Parliament or made up from representatives of both Houses. Clearly, as the Bill has proceeded, it has raised ethical, legal and social issues giving rise to a diverse range of views, some of which are very strongly held. How we in Parliament and those elsewhere respond to such issues goes to the heart of our existence as individuals and families in society. It is, quite rightly, the place of Parliament to consider this.
In moving the new clauses, I understand that my hon. Friends had to ensure that the provisions were in the scope of the Bill. I do not think that this matter should be limited only to the issues that have been raised during the proceedings of this Bill, and I understand that my hon. Friends have raised the issue to start a clear discussion in Parliament about whether there is support for such a proposition. I am of the view that the structure that we have set up with the HFEA, the way in which it regulatesit is not the only source of information and advice for usand the way in which we have proceeded with the Bill are correct. I absolutely do not accept that there is something wrong with the HFEA. It is, frankly, not very helpful to hear senior Members of Parliament talk about needing antis on the HFEA, because that fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the authority.
The nature of the authority is that it advertises for candidates, and anyonepeople of all faiths and culturescan apply. However, potential members must be prepared to accept the fundamental principles behind the authoritys existence. That has served us well over a period of time, but of course, the arrangements are further reinforced by the fact that appointments are made by the Appointments Commission on behalf of the Secretary of State.
While we are debating an incredibly important issue, I hope that nobody outside our proceedings here will read what has been said today and draw from it that we do not have confidence in the process. I know that it is not my hon. Friends intention to suggest that we do not have confidence in the HFEAs ability, as constructed by Parliament, to discharge its duties.
Of course, as the hon. Member for Salisbury pointed outand I have always been of this viewparliamentary scrutiny has demonstrated very clearly that Parliament has the ability to discuss bioethical issues effectively, whether in Select Committees, during pre-legislative scrutiny or through consultation. The Science and Technology Committee under the chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Norfolk, North produced a very extensive report in 2005.

Ian Gibson: I will have that constituency tooit happens to be a Liberal Democrat seat. Mine is Norwich, North.

Jimmy Hood: Order. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to intervene, he should do so. If not, the Minister can carry on.

Dawn Primarolo: I apologise to my hon. Friend if I have had his constituency incorrectly recorded in Hansard.
A very good and extensive report was produced in 2005, which was the outcome of a years study of human reproductive technologies. It had considerable influence on the Department of Healths subsequent public consultation. As has already been acknowledged, the Bill has changed considerably from its draft form.
The real pointmy hon. Friends will correct me if I am wrongis whether we need a wider bioethics Select Committee or Joint Committee of both Houses to consider not just issues that are pertinent to this legislation, but wider matters. Personally, I want parliamentarians to continue to do that, and I think that the Government would resist any idea of anything independent.
As my noble Friend Baroness Royall said in response to such a debate in the other place, we see merit in a Standing Committee of Parliament on bioethics. However, that is not something that it is appropriate to set out in primary legislation, and it is not a matter for this Billwe certainly could not get the proposal in order, given the wider considerations. That is ultimately a matter for Parliament to consider, so let me gently suggest how a consensus may emerge.
The decision to set up a new Select Committee is one for the Houseor both Houses, if it is decided that there should be a Joint Committee. Of course, the Government would consider any suggestion for a new Select Committee that had sufficient support from all parties. In addition to taking account of the views that have been clearly expressed during our deliberations in Committee, it might also be appropriate if views were sought from the Modernisation Committee and the Procedure Committee about why and how this step could be taken forward. I am advised that this would be a matter for the House and that progress should be made through the usual channels.
I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, South-East will not push the new clause to a Division, but as the Minister responsible for the Bill, I will ensure that I draw the comments of all members of the Committee on the wider issue to the attention of the appropriate authorities in the House. Such a Committee, perhaps a Joint Committee, could strengthen our understanding, and the way in which we discharge our roles as Members of Parliament, when we address these important social and ethical issues.

Brian Iddon: I am grateful for my right hon. Friends comments, which are very acceptable. The other place asked for guidance from this end of Parliament on the issue and it would have been remiss of us if we had not discussed it this afternoon. I think that some guidance has been given from this Committee to the other place and to Parliament in general. As my right hon. Friend pointed out, we now need to lobby outside this Committee.
The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon referred to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. My idea was to have a parallel Committee with a similar membership. It has always amazed me that we discuss human rights in this place, but we do not, in parallel, discuss ethics, which are becoming much more important as Bills such as this pass through Parliament. It might well be that 30 is too many members for the Committee, but the figure of eight that was mentioned in the other place would be too small. Somewhere in between those two numbers would be acceptable, I am sure.
Obviously, the new clause is too narrow; it had to be drafted in such a way that it would remain within the scope of the Bill. My preference would be not only to have a broader Committee for human bioethics, but to introduce consideration of animal bioethics, because matters such as xenotransplantation cross both the human and animal spheres.
It has been good to have the debate and I thank my right hon. Friend again for her comments. I am sure that we have given some guidance to the other place as the Bill has proceeded, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered,
That certain written evidence already reported to the House be appended to the proceedings of the Committee.[Dawn Primarolo.]

Question proposed, That the Chairman do report the Bill (except clauses 4, 11, 14 and 23, schedule 2, and any new clauses or new schedules relating to the termination of pregnancy by registered medical practitioners), as amended, to the House.

Dawn Primarolo: Before we conclude our proceedings, I would like to make a few comments. I would like to thank you, Mr. Hood, and Mr. Gale for the excellent way in which you have helped us through the Committee proceedings. My thanks to the Clerks, who are ever vigilant and have done their best to ensure that we debate all the issues identified as necessary by the Committee. Thanks to the Hansard staff, to the police officers and to those to whom I am not normally supposed to refer: my officials. I thank them for all the hard workover a long time nowthat they put into producing an excellent Bill.
I would like to thank the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness for his measured, thoughtful and constructive approach, which I appreciated. We have been considering subjects that were difficult and challenging for me, as a Minister, but I know that that would be even harder in opposition without such detailed support. The issues that he raised helped our debate, as did those raised with considerable skill by his hon. Friends.
I also thank the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon, who turns out to have many skillsall excellent. He truly has followed and worked on the subject for a long time. He has considerable expertise. We are glad that he shared some of that expertise with us, but we might have been here longer had we heard it to its full extent. I thank him because I know that he follows the debate with great diligence and passion. His colleague, the hon. Member for Southport, has not always agreed with him. It was interesting to see one intervening on the other during speeches. They disagreed slightly, but they have been helpful to the Committee.
Finally, I thank my hon. Friends, who brought considerable knowledge, patience, advice and consideration to their support of me as the Minister on the Bill, even when they did not always agree with me. I am particularly referring to my right hon. Friend the Member for Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill, who is not able to be here this afternoon.
This has been an excellent Committee and I am grateful for our proceedings and everyones participation. I look forward to further debate on the Floor of the House.

Mark Simmonds: I join the Minister in expressing my thanks to you, Mr. Hood, and to Mr. Gale for the excellent way in which you have chaired the Committee and for the advice and guidance that you have given as and when it has been appropriate. I also thank, in particular, the Clerks who have been involved in the Bill, who have provided support and advice to Opposition Members, who, as the Minister rightly pointed out, do not have the support of the expert civil servants that she clearly has.
I thank members of the Committee, particularly my hon. Friends the Members for Salisbury, for South-West Devon, for Hemel Hempstead and for Rugby and Kenilworth, who have all participated in our proceedings. In their individual ways, their informed and measured contributions have been helpful and constructive in our debates.
I wish to say how much I have enjoyed the contributions from, and the interaction between, the hon. Members for Oxford, West and Abingdon and for Southport. It is always said that the Conservative party is a broad church, but we have seen today that the Liberal party is even broader. It would be helpful at some point to see whether the two hon. Gentlemen agree about anything. I also thank Labour members of the Committee, particularly the hon. Members for Norwich, North, for Bolton, South-East and for Brighton, Kemptown who, again in their individual ways, made significant contributions at different times in our proceedings.
Finally, I thank the Minister for, most of the time, her extremely calm and considered response to the debates. She has always been helpful, constructive and clear, and she responded with great clarity to the concerns that were expressed, the questions that were asked and the amendments that were tabled. Such issues are complex and challenging. I am sure that the right hon. Lady would acknowledge that neither she nor I are scientists and that trying to try to get to grips first with the science, and then overlaying the ethical issues, is extremely challenging for anyone who does not have a grounding in such areas. I wish to put on the record the fact that I thought that she did so with great aplomb. She has obviously put a tremendous amount of work into understanding the detail behind the Bill. While we might not agree on every political issue, I hope that the constructive way in which the questions have been put and the amendments have been explained have led to a constructive response from the Government, and that that will mean that the Bill, when enacted, will last just as longif not longerthan the 1990 Act.

Evan Harris: I take this opportunity to thank you, Mr. Hood, and your co-Chairman, Mr. Gale, for the way in which you chaired the Committee. I note that we have finished earlier than we had catered for, which is a testament to the fact that we have made excellent progress throughout. It is only fair that I first associate myself with the remarks of the Minister and the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness in thanking all those who have been of great help to the Committee.
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Southport on putting his views so well. We have been debating a free-vote issue, and clearly neither he nor I have the skill shown by the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness as he represented all strands of the Conservative party. We decided to split the questions and ensure that we gained clarity from both sides on some fundamental ethical issues. On the one hand, I was delighted that my hon. Friend was to be a member of the Committee while, on the other hand, I was worried about it because he puts his views, which I sometimes do not share, so well.
I thank the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness for his kind words, as I thank the Minister for hers, although I wish to reject absolutely her scurrilous allegation that I have any skill as a draftsmanor that I claim such skillor even that I have skill as a conciliator. I thank her for her approach in her more positive moments, which made being a member of the Committee as much of a pleasure as her less positive moments made it less so.
In concluding, I thank Becky Purvis from my office. She has had a heavy load to bear over the past few years on the issue. I welcome the contributions to the debate from other members of the Committee whose parliamentary career has been engaged in the study of some of the scientific issues involved. Although we have finished our proceedings well within time, I hope that that does not mean that we will not have enough time to debate on the Floor of the House issues that need to be decided on a free vote. We have had so few Divisions during our proceedings and finished so quickly because we know that other voices need to be heard on certain issues. I look forward to hearing them on Report.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill (except clauses 4, 11, 14 and 23, schedule 2, and any new clauses or new schedules relating to the termination of pregnancy by registered medical practitioners), as amended, to be reported.

Committee rose at eight minutes past Three oclock.